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Melinda Taylor* and Charles Chernor Jalloh** 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the widely ignored but important issue regarding the provisional 
arrest and detention of persons suspected of having committed international crimes by 
international or internationalized courts. The paper examines the pioneer case law and 
practice of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, as well as the emerging practice of the permanent International 
Criminal Court, to evaluate how these courts have generally addressed the rights of these 
individuals to due process and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention before prosecutors 
seek formal charges against them.  
 
The authors argue that while the early international jurisprudence established apparently 
strong legal standards to preserve the rights of suspects, using doctrines such as abuse of 
process, these courts have generally failed to offer the meaningful remedies required to resolve 
manifest violations of such fundamental human rights by the detaining authorities. The 
article offers preliminary recommendations on how, going forward, the rights guaranteed to 
suspects allegedly involved in the worst crimes known to law in international(ized) courts may 
be better protected. 
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I.  Introduction 
Nature abhors a vacuum—so does the law; or rather, so should the law. Post-9/11, the 
existence of legal black holes concerning the protection and enforcement of detainees’ rights 
has attracted almost universal condemnation from the United Nations and various regional 
human rights courts. Indeed, in its recent report to the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, the United States of America proudly proclaimed that “[w]e start from the 
premise that there are no law-free zones, and that everyone is entitled to protection under 
law.”1 
It is thus surprising that the same disapprobation has not been applied to the legal black 
holes, which have tainted the record of the various ad hoc courts established over the past 
twenty years to dispense justice to countries that have experienced genocide, serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, and crimes against humanity. Notwithstanding 
the fact that some of these courts are established by the U.N. Security Council, acting 
pursuant to its extraordinary Chapter VII power, they are all powerless to implement their 
own decisions.2 They are therefore completely reliant on national authorities or multi-
national peacekeeping bodies to arrest and detain suspects and defendants before their 
transfer to the court in question. 
This enforced division of tasks, which arises in part from the state-centric nature of the 
international legal system, has created ambiguity concerning who is responsible for 
remedying any violations of a suspect’s or defendant’s rights, which may have occurred prior 
to his or her transfer to the relevant international or hybrid court. Indeed, having entrusted 
national authorities with the apprehension aspects of the criminal justice process, can the 
tribunals subsequently distance themselves from any violations which may have been 
committed by those national authorities? 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights provides that no one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention,3 and that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
constitution or by law.”4 This right was enshrined in Article 2 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.5 Under that provision, states undertook to ensure that any 
person whose rights are violated shall not only have an effective remedy, but also to ensure 
that any person claiming a remedy shall have his or her right thereto determined by 
competent judicial, administrative, legislative or other authorities, and to ensure that such 
                                                           
 1. Report of the United States of America Submitted to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights in Conjunction with the Universal Periodic Review ¶ 82 (2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/146379.pdf. 
 2. See U.N. Charter Ch. VII (conferring powers on the United Nations Security Council to determine 
any threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression and to make recommendations, 
or decide what measures to take, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security, with decisions being binding on all U.N. member states pursuant 
to Article 25).  
 3. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 9, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
 4. Id. art. 8. 
 5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), annex, U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16 at 55, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR].  
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authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.6 However, this right to a remedy 
before national courts is meaningless if those courts have ceded their jurisdiction over the 
case to an international or internationalized court. There is also a lingering perception which 
emerges from the jurisprudence of these courts that, notwithstanding the presumption of 
innocence, persons accused of the most horrific crimes in the legal lexicon are not so entitled. 
Moreover, political realities have inevitably played an unfortunate role in the practical 
challenges that beset these courts, and the judicial response to such realities. For example, 
the early promise set out by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) in the 1999 Barayagwiza decision that every victim of a rights violation 
deserved a remedy7 was swiftly reined back in the 2000 review decision.8 It is, of course, 
difficult to dissociate the latter decision from the Rwandan government threat that it would 
cease all forms of cooperation with the ICTR if Barayagwiza were to be released. 
This Article analyzes the main jurisprudence which has emerged from the different 
international courts and tribunals regarding provisional arrest and detention. It assesses 
whether, and if so how well, the courts and tribunals have addressed the lacuna arising from 
the outsourcing or subcontracting of the incarceration function to national authorities. The 
specific focus here is on individuals provisionally detained by national authorities, at the 
request of an international(ized) court, before they are formally charged with any crimes. 
The Article proceeds in two parts. Part II focuses on the early as well as more recent 
practice of the pioneer U.N. international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It 
then discusses provisional detention in the jurisprudence of the mixed courts for Cambodia 
and Lebanon. Part III draws some conclusions from the review of the legal standards 
established in the jurisprudence. Keeping in mind that this is largely uncharted area of 
international criminal tribunal practice, the conclusion offers initial practical 
recommendations on ways in which the system of provisional arrest or pre-charge 
incarceration might be improved. Here, the authors draw on the recent and seemingly more 
progressive jurisprudence from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon which appears to enhance 
the remedies enjoyed by suspects and defendants whose rights have been violated. 
II.  Provisional Arrest in International Criminal Justice 
A. The Practice of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals 
The ICTR experienced fewer difficulties than its counterpart, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in apprehending accused, but seemingly more 
difficulties in conducting investigations and preparing indictments in a timely manner. There 
have thus been several ICTR cases in which the defendants alleged that they were detained 
                                                           
 6. Id. art. 2. 
 7. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶¶ 72, 76, 88, 112 (Nov. 3, 
1999), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.pdf. 
 8. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision on Review and/or 
Reconsideration (Sept. 14, 2000), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/140900.pdf. 
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for the tribunal by national authorities, especially during the early part of its mandate.9 
These arrests usually preceded the prosecution’s filing of indictments, and their detention 
and transfer to the seat of the court in Arusha, Tanzania. In the first appellate decision to 
consider the status of such persons—the landmark Barayagwiza appeal decision—the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber both broadened the notion as to when the Tribunal should assume 
responsibility for the detention of a suspect by national authorities, and explicitly stated that 
the defendant would have a right to a remedy irrespective of the author of the violation.10 
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was arrested in March 1996 and held in Cameroon for nineteen 
months without being informed of the charges against him.11 Following his transfer to the 
Tribunal, he was held for a further ninety-six days without making an initial appearance.12 
In relation to the period of detention in Cameroon, the Chamber observed that on February 
21, 1997, the Prosecutor had requested the Cameroonian authorities to provisionally detain 
Barayagwiza under Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.13 Under that provision, 
the Prosecutor may, in cases of urgency, request a state to take provisional measures, 
including detaining a suspect, if he believes that the suspect might flee from the 
jurisdiction.14 
On March 4, 1997, the Tribunal issued an order directing Cameroon to provisionally 
detain Barayagwiza pending his transfer to the ICTR under Rule 40bis. The order further 
specified that the suspect be temporarily detained within the ICTR detention unit for a 
maximum of thirty days, and pending the filing of an indictment by the Prosecutor within 
thirty days. Notwithstanding this order, the indictment against Barayagwiza was not 
confirmed until October 23, 1997, and the defendant was not transferred to the Tribunal until 
November 19, 1997.15 
The ICTR Appeals Chamber noted that whilst Rule 40bis specified that a suspect could 
only be provisionally detained by the international tribunal for a maximum of thirty days 
(unless the judge extends the provisional detention order for a maximum of ninety days in 
total), Rule 40 did not set out explicit deadlines as to the length of time which a national 
authority could provisionally detain a suspect upon a request by the Prosecutor.16 Citing the 
principle of effective interpretation, the Appeals Chamber observed that: 
                                                           
 9. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Juvenal Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44-I, Decision on the Defence Motion 
Concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused and on the Defence Notice of 
Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing (May 8, 2000), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kajelijeli/decisions/080500.pdf; Prosecutor v. André 
Rwamakuba et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the Defence Motion Concerning the Illegal 
Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused (Dec. 12, 2000), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rwamakuba/decisions/121200.pdf. Similar claims 
were also made in other cases such as those involving Edouard Karemera and Mathieu 
Ngirumpatse. Most of the suspects were arrested in Cameroon, where twelve to fourteen Rwandans 
were arrested on April 15, 1996. 
 10. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision.  
 11. Id. ¶ 51. 
 12. Id. ¶ 67. 
 13. Id. ¶¶ 54–56. 
 14. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 10, 30. 
 15. Id. ¶¶ 22, 30–31, 44–45. 
 16. Id. ¶¶ 46–48. 
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The purpose of Rule 40bis is to restrict the length of time a suspect may be detained 
without being indicted. We cannot accept that the Prosecutor, acting alone under Rule 
40, has an unlimited power to keep a suspect under provisional detention in a State, 
when Rule 40bis places time limits on such detention if the suspect is detained at the 
Tribunal’s detention unit. Rather, the principle of effective interpretation mandates 
that these Rules be read together and that they be restrictively interpreted.17 
In order to determine whether the stricter requirements of Rule 40bis should be applied, 
the Appeals Chamber then considered whether Barayagwiza could be deemed to have been 
detained under the authority of the ICTR during the period he was incarcerated in 
Cameroon. The Appeals Chamber noted that “but for” the request of the Prosecutor under 
Rule 40, and the subsequent Rule 40bis request for transfer, the defendant would have been 
released by the Cameroon authorities in February, which is when they had denied Rwanda’s 
request that Barayagwiza be extradited to its jurisdiction for trial.18 The appellate court 
concluded that Cameroon was holding the defendant on constructive custody for the 
international tribunal, and that as such, the ICTR was responsible for the fact that the 
defendant was being detained, although not for each and every aspect of the conditions of his 
detention by Cameroonian authorities.19 
The Appeals Chamber thus applied Rule 40bis, and held that the maximum time limit of 
ninety days had clearly been exceeded.20 The total length of his detention in Cameroon could 
also be considered to be unreasonable by human rights standards concerning provisional 
detention.21 The Appeals Chamber also found that Barayagwiza’s right to be promptly 
informed of the nature of the charges against him was also violated during this period.22 
Notwithstanding this detailed analysis concerning the responsibility of the ICTR for his 
detention in Cameroon, the Appeals Chamber subsequently made the significant finding that 
under the abuse of process doctrine, according to which a court may decline to exercise 
jurisdiction over a defendant if to do so would be antithetical to the causes of justice, “it is 
irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged violations of the 
Appellant’s rights.”23 Accordingly, the judges concluded that the abuse of process doctrine 
could still be triggered if Barayagwiza’s detention had been attributable to Cameroon and not 
the international tribunal.24 The Appeals Chamber reasoned that “[a]t this juncture, it is 
irrelevant that only a small portion of that total period of provisional detention is attributable 
to the Tribunal, since it is the Tribunal—and not any other entity—that is currently 
adjudicating the Appellant’s claims.”25 
Given these strong statements, it is perplexing that the Appeals Chamber only took into 
consideration the time periods during which he had been detained in Cameroon pursuant to a 
                                                           
 17. Id. ¶ 46. 
 18. Id. ¶ 55. 
 19. Id. ¶ 61. 
 20. Id. ¶ 67. 
 21. Id. ¶ 67. 
 22. Id. ¶ 85. 
 23. Id. ¶ 73. 
 24. Id. ¶ 85. The Appeals Chamber concluded that “even if fault is shared between the three organs of 
the Tribunal—or is the result of the actions of a third party, such as Cameroon—it would undermine 
the integrity of the judicial process to proceed.” Id. ¶ 73. 
 25. Id. ¶ 85. 
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request by the ICTR Prosecutor, and excluded the interim period of approximately nine 
months during which the Cameroonian authorities continued to detain him pursuant to an 
extradition request by Rwanda in order to prosecute him for the same alleged crimes. It may 
be that the judges felt that matter to be outside their jurisdiction, insofar as his detention at 
the behest of a different authority (Rwanda) does not necessarily translate into responsibility 
for the Tribunal. On the other hand, while the Prosecutor’s request for the suspect to be 
detained followed only two days after the Rwandan extradition request, which might have 
been deemed displaced because of the international court’s primacy over national 
jurisdictions, this judicial approach may be criticized on at least two grounds. 
First, the ICTR Prosecutor filed his request for detention under Rule 40 the same day that 
the Cameroon authorities rejected Rwanda’s request for extradition.26 Second, the ICTR 
Prosecutor appears to have adopted an unhelpful “wait and see approach.” With this view, it 
would seem that the Prosecution was only prepared to step in to claim jurisdiction if the 
defendant could not be extradited and prosecuted in Rwanda. The timing of the requests 
suggests a measure of coordination between the national authority and the Prosecutor. And it 
may be that this is a matter that properly falls within the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 
especially if investigations were ongoing and a determination had not been made to pursue 
this particular defendant. However, it is arguable that such an approach is hardly consistent 
with the principles of prosecutorial diligence, so eloquently set out in the decision, and that by 
waiting to assert the ICTR’s primacy, the Prosecutor had materially contributed to the length 
of the defendant’s detention in Cameroon. 
In its analysis of the scope of the abuse of process doctrine, the Appeals Chamber also 
concluded that, 
[T]he abuse of process doctrine may be relied on in two distinct situations: (1) where 
delay has made a fair trial for the accused impossible; and (2) where in the 
circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with the trial of the accused would 
contravene the court’s sense of justice, due to pre-trial impropriety or misconduct.27 
In accordance with this finding, the defendant would still have the right to rely on the abuse 
of process doctrine even if he or she is unable to prove deliberate impropriety or misconduct. 
In terms of the appropriate remedy for these violations of the rights of the accused, the 
Prosecution argued that the accused was entitled to either an order requiring an expeditious 
trial or credit for any time provisionally served.28 With respect to the first of the Prosecutor’s 
suggestions, the Appeals Chamber noted that an order for the Appellant to be expeditiously 
tried would be superfluous as a remedy since the accused is already entitled to an expedited 
trial pursuant to Article 19(1) of the statute that sets out the fundamental rights of suspects 
and accused.29 
Regarding the second suggestion by the Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber was 
unconvinced that it could adequately protect the accused and provide an adequate remedy for 
the violations of his rights, particularly in the event that the accused is acquitted.30 
                                                           
 26. Id. ¶ 7. 
 27. Id. ¶ 77. 
 28. Id. ¶ 102. 
 29. Id. ¶ 103. 
 30. Id. ¶ 103. 
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Consequently, the Appeals Chamber ordered that the accused be released to Cameroon, and 
that the order would be with prejudice to the Prosecution (i.e., the Prosecution would be 
barred from issuing a new indictment against the accused and seeking his re-arrest).31 
After learning of the decision, the Government of Rwanda threatened to end all 
cooperation with the ICTR.32 This would have meant that the Prosecutor would have had 
serious difficulty to conduct any investigations into international crimes in the territory of 
Rwanda. The Prosecution therefore filed a request with the Appeals Chamber to review the 
decision under Rule 119 on the basis that it had “new facts” of a decisive character.33 The 
Appeals Chamber had a different composition due to the departure of Judge Kirk Macdonald, 
whose reasoning appeared to have given great weight to U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
in the abuse of process context. This newly composed Chamber accepted these new facts and 
reversed its decision to release the accused.34  
Regarding the violations that occurred prior to his transfer to the Tribunal, the Chamber 
attached importance to evidence, which apparently demonstrated that the defendant would 
have been aware of the nature of the charges against him from May 3, 1996 onwards.35 There 
was also evidence that the delays in his transfer to the Tribunal appeared to be attributable 
to Cameroon.36 In other words, Barayagwiza was, at most, kept in the dark about the charges 
against him for a total of eighteen days. The Chamber concluded that the new facts 
“diminish[ed] the role played by the failings of the Prosecutor as well as the intensity of the 
violation of the rights of the Appellant.”37 The Appeals Chamber therefore held that the 
violations were not sufficiently grave to justify the defendant’s release, and that it would be 
adequate to either compensate the defendant if he were to be eventually acquitted, or to 
reduce his sentence if convicted.38 
Since the decision was predicated upon its consideration of new facts, as opposed to a 
reconsideration of the law,39 the Appeals Chamber did not have the power to reverse its 
earlier legal findings, which thus remain applicable.40 However, in expressly attributing its 
decision to the “new fact” that it was Cameroon, rather than the Prosecutor, that was 
responsible for the delays in transferring Barayagwiza, the Appeals Chamber appears to be 
implicitly reversing its earlier finding in the November 1999 decision that it was “irrelevant 
                                                           
 31. Id. ¶¶ 108, 113. 
 32. See Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration), ¶ 34 (Mar. 31, 2000), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs20000331.pdf. 
 33. Id. ¶¶ 7, 13, 15, 25. 
 34. Id. ¶¶ 74–75. 
 35. Id. ¶¶ 54–55. 
 36. Id. ¶ 58. 
 37. Id. ¶ 71. 
 38. Id. ¶ 75. 
 39. The Appeals Chamber rejected the Prosecutor’s request for reconsideration. Id. ¶ 73. 
 40. The Tribunal has power to review or to reconsider its decisions when a new fact has been discovered 
which was not known at the time of the proceedings before the Appeals Chamber, and which could 
have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision. Either the convicted person or the Prosecutor 
may submit an application for review of the judgment, which in the normal course, is subject to the 
res judicata principle. In this instance, the Tribunal considered that it had the power to review its 
earlier decision; such review was necessary due to the finality of the decision, the remedy of which 
was dismissal of the indictment with prejudice against the prosecutor.  
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which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged violations of the Appellant’s rights.”41 
The review decision does not address this aspect of the earlier decision, nor does it elaborate 
as to why the diminishment of the Prosecutor’s responsibility concerning the delay in transfer 
is relevant to the gravity of the violations or the remedy. 
It is possible to reconcile the two decisions by concluding that whilst it is not necessary to 
attribute responsibility to an organ of the Tribunal to either obtain a remedy, or trigger the 
application of the abuse of process doctrine, the involvement of an organ of the ICTR would be 
an aggravating circumstance, which could transform an infraction into an egregious violation. 
Of note, however, is the fact that the Appeals Chamber recognized that the defendant would 
be entitled to remedies other than release if the standard for release was not met. That said, 
the decision lacks clarity as to whether the appeals judges considered that the violations 
constituted an abuse of process (albeit of a less significant kind), but that release was not an 
appropriate remedy. Another possibility is that they considered that, in light of the 
diminishment of both the severity of the violations and the involvement of the Prosecutor, 
there was no abuse of process, but that the defendant was nonetheless entitled to a remedy. 
In terms of the continued applicability of the November 1999 decision, subsequent ICTY 
and ICTR decisions have adopted varied approaches as to whether the legal findings set out 
in the earlier November 1999 decision should still be considered as valid appellate precedent. 
For example, in the ICTR Semanza case, which involved facts that were virtually identical to 
the Barayagwiza case, the Appeals Chamber determined that there were cogent reasons for 
departing from the November 1999 decision’s interpretation of Rule 40bis, and in particular, 
whether it could be applied to scenarios in which the defendant is physically detained by 
national authorities instead of the ICTR.42 
The Appeals Chamber justified its departure on the legislative history of Rule 40bis based 
on the Prosecution submission that the rule had been amended on July 4, 1996—less than 
two months after its first adoption—to replace the words “30 days from the signing of the 
provisional detention order” with “30 days from the day after the transfer of the suspect to the 
detention unit of the Tribunal.”43 The Appeals Chamber held that this amendment evinced a 
clear intention that the thirty day maximum time period for the defendant’s detention should 
only commence to run once he or she had been physically transferred to the International 
Tribunal.44 The impact of this interpretation on the rights of defendants can be demonstrated 
by the following discrepancy between the treatment of detainees who were arrested in 
accordance with the first version of Rule 40bis as compared to those who fell under the 
amended Rule 40bis regime. 
Before turning to that discussion, it is perhaps appropriate to underscore from the ICTR’s 
First Annual Report to the United Nations that Rule 40bis was first adopted at the behest of 
the Prosecutor, who advocated that there should be a power to provisionally detain suspects 
prior to the filing of an indictment due to the “difficulties encountered by the Prosecutor in 
                                                           
 41. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶ 73 (Nov. 3, 1999), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.pdf. 
 42. Laurent Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, ¶ 92 (May 31, 2000), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Semanza/decisions/310500.pdf. 
 43. Id. ¶¶ 92–95. 
 44. Id. ¶ 97. 
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conducting his investigation.”45 After the initial adoption of Rule 40bis, Judge Lennart 
Aspergren ordered that four suspects46 detained by Cameroon be transferred to the Tribunal 
to be provisionally detained, pending the filing of an indictment by the Prosecutor within 
thirty days.47 In light of the continued failure of Cameroon to transfer the defendants to the 
International Tribunal, two additional thirty day periods of provisional detention were 
authorized.48 The third decision, which was issued by Judge Laïty Kama on July 16, 1996 
(i.e., after the Rule 40bis amendment had been adopted but before it entered into force) 
emphasized that Bagosora’s provisional detention in Cameroon would be extended for a third 
and final period of thirty days.49 It is thus apparent that Judge Kama considered the time 
limits set out in Rule 40bis to apply to provisional detention by a national authority. 
The Prosecutor eventually filed its indictment against Bagosora eleven days before the 
expiration of the ninety day deadline. In contrast, after the Rule 40bis amendment entered 
into force, the Prosecutor did not file indictments against Barayagwiza or Semanza until after 
they had been detained at the request of the Tribunal approximately eight months 
respectively.50 The amendment therefore appears to have had the effect of both significantly 
diluting prosecutorial diligence, and diminishing the right of the defendants to be promptly 
informed of the nature and cause of the charges against them. 
In terms of further discrepancies between the Semanza appellate findings and the 1999 
Barayagwiza decision, the Appeals Chamber emphasized “that in any event, the Tribunal is 
not responsible for the time that elapsed before the Appellant was transferred to the 
Tribunal’s Detention Facility.”51 The Semanza Appeals Chamber also disregarded the 
Barayagwiza dicta that it is irrelevant which entity is responsible for the violations.52 In any 
event, the Appeals Chamber found that the defendant’s rights had been violated due to the 
failure to promptly inform him of the charges, and the failure of the Court to dispose of his 
habeas corpus motion.53 As was the case with the 2000 Barayagwiza decision, the Chamber 
                                                           
 45. Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other 
Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States between 1 Jan. and 31 Dec. 1994, ¶ 35,U.N. Doc. A/51/399-S/1996/778, (Sept. 
24, 1996) [hereinafter ICTR—First Annual Report], available at 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English%5CLegal%5CBilateral%20Agreement%5CEnglish%5C9625
167e.pdf.  
 46. They were Théoneste Bagosora, Ferdinand Nahimana, Anatole Nsengiyumva and André Ntagerura. 
 47. ICTR—First Annual Report, supra note 45, ¶ 36.  
 48. See Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-96-7-D, Decision: Continued Detention on 
Remand of Théoneste Bagosora, (June 18, 1996), http://www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs/doc15173.pdf. 
 49. “Considering the requirements set forth in Rule 40 bis (D) of the Rules, Considering that the 
Prosecutor has submitted sufficient reasons to show and justify the need for the continued detention 
on remand in order to complete his investigations and criminal proceedings against Théoneste 
Bagosora; Noting that Théoneste Bagosora is still detained by Cameroonian authorities and that his 
transfer to the Tribunal’s Detention Unit has however not yet been implemented despite the 
Tribunal’s decision of 17 May 1996: . . .” Id. at 5–6.  
 50. Laurent Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, ¶ 99 (May 31, 2000), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Semanza/decisions/310500.pdf; Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶ 9 (Nov. 3, 1999), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.pdf. 
 51. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, ¶ 101. 
 52. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶ 73. 
 53. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, ¶ 128. 
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avoided pronouncing whether the violations could constitute an abuse of process, but stated 
that “any violation, even if it entails only a relative degree of prejudice, requires a 
proportionate remedy.”54 
Despite these relatively strong repudiations of the 1999 Barayagwiza findings, the 
Appeals Chamber performed a remarkable about-face in its 2003 decision in the ICTY Nikolic 
case, and more significantly, in the 2005 Kajelijeli Appeals judgment. In Nikolic, the Appeals 
Chamber addressed the following factual allegations: the accused Dragan Nikolic alleged that 
he had been kidnapped by unidentified individuals in Serbia, who had then transferred him 
to the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) base in Bosnia, which had jurisdiction to arrest him in 
accordance with the ICTY arrest warrant.55 Although the case did not concern pre-arrest 
incarceration per se, the Appeals Chamber had the opportunity to expound on the definition 
and limits of the abuse of process doctrine.56 
The appellate chamber first held that before considering whether the actions of the 
unidentified individuals could be attributed to SFOR, it was necessary to consider whether 
this type of violation would justify the Tribunal divesting itself of its personal jurisdiction 
over the accused (and thereby releasing him). The Appeals Chamber reviewed domestic 
jurisprudence, and concluded that for universally condemned offenses such as genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity, violations of state sovereignty would not in themselves 
justify setting aside personal jurisdiction.57 
In terms of what violations would justify the setting aside of personal jurisdiction, the 
Appeals Chamber resurrected the 1999 Barayagwiza holding that the threshold would be met 
“where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s 
rights would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.”58 The Appeals Chamber noted that 
the 2000 Barayagwiza review decision reversed the outcome of the 1999 decision, but 
underscored that that decision had “confirmed its Decision of 3 November 1999 on the basis of 
the facts it was founded on.”59 
With respect to whether the defendant needs to attribute the violations to an organ of the 
Tribunal or an entity associated with it (e.g., SFOR), the Appeals Chamber failed to expressly 
address the issue. The Chamber did, however, endorse the findings of the Trial Chamber that 
in terms of scenarios which “may constitute a legal impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction 
over such an accused . . . [which] would certainly be the case where persons acting for SFOR 
or the Prosecution were involved in such very serious mistreatment.”60 Arguably the use of 
                                                           
 54. Id. ¶ 125. 
 55. Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning 
Legality of Arrest (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 5, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/acdec/en/030605.pdf.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. ¶¶ 24–26. 
 58. Id. ¶ 29 (quoting Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶ 74 (Nov. 
3, 1999), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.pdf.). 
 59. Id. ¶ 29 n.35 (quoting Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision 
(Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration), ¶ 51 (Mar. 31, 2000), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs20000331.pdf). 
 60. Id. ¶ 28 (quoting Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, ¶ 114 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 9, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tdec/en/10131553.htm).  
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the word “certainly” implies that the involvement of SFOR or the Prosecutor would be an 
aggravating factor, but not necessarily a prerequisite. In contradistinction to the approach 
followed in ICTR cases, having found that the violations of the defendant’s rights were not 
sufficiently egregious to invoke the abuse of process doctrine, the Appeals Chamber did not 
then proceed to consider whether the defendant had a right to lesser remedies, such as 
compensation or a reduction in sentence. 
The question as to whether the alleged violations need to be attributed to an organ or 
entity associated with the Tribunal was much more clearly addressed by the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber in its 2005 judgment in the Kajelijeli case, in which the judges decisively 
rehabilitated the 1999 Barayagwiza decision, and further elaborated on the nature of 
prosecutorial due diligence.61 In Kajelijeli, the Appeals Chamber found that the defendant 
had been held in custody by the Benin authorities for ninety-five days prior to his transfer to 
the ICTR, and that he had been in custody for eighty-five days before being served with an 
arrest warrant or indictment. For this time period, the defendant should be considered to 
have been a “suspect,”62 and as such, was entitled to the protection of the rights enjoyed by 
suspects under the ICTR Statute and Rules.63 
In line with the Semanza appellate judgment finding that Rule 40bis does not apply prior 
to a defendant’s transfer to the Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber noted the lacunae in the rules 
concerning the manner in which states parties should implement provisional detention 
requested by the Prosecutor, and the corollary lack of procedural safeguards, such as the 
right to be promptly informed of the reasons for the arrest, and to be brought before a judge.64 
The Appeals Chamber nonetheless emphasized that whilst “[i]t is for the requested State to 
decide how to implement its obligations under international law,”65 in executing the request 
for provisional detention, “the international division of labour in prosecuting crimes must not 
be to the detriment of the apprehended person.”66 
The Appeals Chamber instructively delineated the respective obligations of the ICTR 
Prosecutor and the national authorities. Regarding the ICTR Prosecutor, once it had initiated 
a case against a defendant, it had an obligation of due diligence, which would translate into a 
positive obligation to ensure that the defendant’s rights were respected.67 In particular, the 
Prosecutor must expressly notify the authorities of the detaining state of their duty to bring 
the suspect promptly before a judge in accordance with the detaining state’s “obligation to 
respect the human rights of the suspect as protected in customary international law, in the 
                                                           
 61. Juvénal Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, ¶ 210 (May 23, 2005), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kajelijeli/judgement/appealsjudgement.doc.pdf. 
 62. The Chamber referred to the fact that under Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, a 
suspect is defined as a “person concerning whom the Prosecutor possesses reliable information 
which tends to show that he may have committed a crime over which the Tribunal has 
jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 217. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. ¶ 219.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. ¶ 220. 
 67. Id.  
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international treaties to which it has acceded, as well as in its own national legislation.”68 At 
a minimum, a judge in the state which is detaining the suspect must: 
• communicate the ICTR’s request for surrender/transfer to the suspect; 
• familiarize the suspect with any charge; 
• verify the suspect’s identity, and medical status; 
• examine any “obvious” challenges to the case barring issues concerning the merits 
of the case; and 
• notify the suspect’s consular authorities.69 
At the same time, the Prosecutor must notify an ICTR judge that the suspect is being 
detained by national authorities, so that the judge can prepare a provisional arrest warrant 
and transfer order.70 
The Appeals Chamber also expounded in detail what is meant by the suspect’s right to be 
informed of the reasons for his or her arrest.71 This right is triggered as soon as the suspect is 
arrested at the behest of the ICTR.72 The appellate chamber observed that under Rule 2 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, a suspect was defined as a “person concerning whom 
the Prosecutor possesses reliable information which tends to show that he may have 
committed a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction.”73 Since Rule 40 only permits the 
Prosecutor to request the arrest of a “suspect,” it follows that the Prosecutor must at that 
time possess reliable information that tends to show that the person being provisionally 
arrested committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICTR.74 The appeals judges implied 
that the suspect must be informed of this evidence in order to challenge whether the 
conditions for provisional arrest under Rule 40 were met. However, at this point in time, the 
suspect’s rights would not be violated if he was not arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant 
due to the exigencies of the situation (Rule 40 does not require a judicial order from the 
ICTR).75 
In terms of the suspect’s status once the Prosecutor had obtained a Rule 40bis order from 
an ICTR judge for transfer and provisional detention, the Appeals Chamber quoted from the 
1999 Barayagwiza decision, concluding that the suspect’s right to be informed of the charges 
is of paramount importance at this stage for two reasons. First, it “ ‘counterbalances the 
interest of the prosecuting authority in seeking continued detention of the suspect’ by giving 
the suspect ‘the opportunity to deny the offence and obtain his release prior to the initiation of 
trial proceedings.’ ”76 Second, it “gives the suspect information he requires in order to prepare 
his defence.”77 
                                                           
 68. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 69. Id. ¶ 221. 
 70. Id. ¶ 222. 
 71. Id. ¶ 217. 
 72. Id. ¶ 226. 
 73. Id. ¶ 217. 
 74. Id. ¶ 227. 
 75. Id. ¶ 226. 
 76. Id. ¶ 229 (quoting Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶¶ 80–81 
(Nov. 3, 1999), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.pdf). 
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Notably, in contrast to the position in the Semanza case that the ninety day provisional 
detention maximum in Rule 40bis would not apply to provisional detention by a national 
authority, the Appeals Chamber relied on the 1999 Barayagwiza decision to conclude that 
provisional detention of a suspect who has not been charged would only be acceptable if it 
were limited to a maximum of ninety days and the procedural safeguards in Rules 40 and 
40bis are implemented.78 The Appeals Chamber also subsequently relied on the 1999 
Barayagwiza decision’s finding that Rule 40 must be construed in a manner which is 
consistent with the safeguards in Rule 40bis. It therefore concluded that: 
[I]t is not acceptable for the Prosecution, acting alone under Rule 40, to get around 
those time limits or the Tribunal’s responsibility to ensure the rights of the suspect in 
provisional detention upon transfer to the Tribunal’s custody under Rules 40 and 40bis, 
by using its power under Rule 40 to keep a suspect under detention in a cooperating 
State.79 
In this particular case, the Appeals Chamber ruled that provisional detention in Benin for 
a period of eighty-five days, without being informed of the charges, and without being brought 
before a judge, constituted a violation of the defendant’s rights.80 The Prosecution’s 
responsibility was triggered by the fact that they failed to exercise prosecutorial diligence: 
namely, the Prosecutor failed to make a timely request for the suspect’s transfer to the ICTR, 
and did not request the national authorities to notify the defendant of the evidential basis for 
considering him a suspect or the nature of any provisional charges.81 
With regards to the fact that the defendant was not promptly brought before a judge, the 
Appeals Chamber recognized that the Benin authorities were partially responsible, but 
nonetheless emphasized that “although the violation is not solely attributable to the Tribunal, 
it has to be recalled that it was the Prosecution, thus an organ of the Tribunal, which was the 
requesting institution responsible for triggering the Appellant’s apprehension, arrest and 
detention in Benin.”82 In terms of the defendant’s right to a remedy, the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that since the violations were not egregious in nature, it would not be justified to 
dismiss the case against the defendant; rather, a more proportionate remedy would be to 
reduce the defendant’s sentence.83 
This remedy of reducing the sentence to compensate for the violations should be in 
addition to the reduction granted due to giving the defendant credit for time served in 
provisional detention in Benin.84 In this regard, it is notable that the Trial Chamber had 
granted the defendant sentencing credit for  
periods during which Kajelijeli was detained solely on the basis of the Rwandan 
warrant of arrest because this warrant was based on the same allegations that form the 
                                                           
 78. Id. (citing Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶ 62). 
 79. Id. ¶ 233. 
 80. Id. ¶ 231. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. ¶ 232. 
 83. Id. ¶ 255. 
 84. Id. ¶ 322. 
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subject matter of this trial. In such circumstances, fairness requires that account be 
taken of the total period Kajelijeli spent in custody.85 
Although there have not been any further substantive appeal decisions concerning 
detention by national authorities post-Kajelijeli, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has had the 
opportunity to clarify whether the Prosecutor’s direct involvement in the alleged violations is 
a precondition for the abuse of process doctrine in other contexts. In a decision issued in the 
Karadžic case in relation to the defendant’s claim that he had been promised immunity by 
representatives of the United States government, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the 
Trial Chamber had erred in rejecting the applicability of the abuse of process doctrine on the 
grounds that the United States’ representative was a third party who was not connected to 
the ICTY.86 The Appeals Chamber also upheld the defendant’s argument that the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY does “not introduce a dual standard for the abuse of process 
doctrine, depending on the nature of the entity which carried out the alleged misconduct.”87 
In any case, irrespective of which entity is responsible for perpetrating the violations, the 
defendant must still establish that he suffered serious mistreatment or that the violations 
were egregious.88 
In a subsequent decision issued on February 10, 2010 in Seselj, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber expressly adopted the 1999 Barayagwiza finding that “the abuse of process doctrine 
does not require the identification of the party responsible for the alleged violations of the 
accused’s rights.”89 The appeals judges further clarified that 
[O]nly two situations may be considered as constituting a serious and egregious 
violation of the accused’s rights: (i) where a fair trial for the accused is impossible, 
usually for reasons of delay; and (ii) where the trial of the accused is marred by 
procedures which contravene the court’s sense of justice.90 
On the basis of the jurisprudence above, pre-transfer violations could arguably fall under 
either of these two categories: keeping the defendant in provisional detention for an 
unreasonable length of time could trigger the first category of abuse of process, irrespective of 
which entity was responsible for the delay; alternatively, if the ICTY or ICTR Prosecutor 
were to deliberately abstain from requesting the suspect’s transfer to the Tribunal in a timely 
manner for reasons of prosecutorial strategy (i.e., because the Prosecutor is aware it has 
insufficient evidence to confirm an indictment and needs more time to gather evidence 
against the suspect), this could potentially trigger the second category. The defendant may 
even be entitled to sentencing credit for detention which has not been requested by the 
                                                           
 85. Juvénal Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 966 (Dec. 1, 
2003), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kajelijeli/judgement/031201-TC2-J-ICTR-98-
44A-T-JUDGEMENT%20AND%20SENTENCE-EN_.pdf. 
 86. Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, Decision on Karadžic’s Appeal of Trial 
Chamber’s Decision on Alleged Holbrooke Agreement, ¶ 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/acdec/en/091012.pdf. 
 87. Id. ¶ 47. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Oral Request of the Accused for 
Abuse of Process, ¶ 20 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 10, 2010), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tdec/en/100210a.pdf. 
 90. Id. ¶ 21. 
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Tribunal, if the factual basis for his detention is similar to the allegations set out in the 
court’s subsequent indictment. 
B. The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is founded on complementarity: the notion that 
the permanent ICC is a court of last resort which will only exercise jurisdiction over cases if 
national courts are inactive, unwilling or unable to do so themselves. At the same time, as is 
the case with other international courts and tribunals, the ICC is dependent on national 
authorities to implement its judicial decisions and orders. This dependence raises the 
practical catch-22 that, on the one hand, the ICC is assuming jurisdiction over a case because 
the national authorities are either unable or unwilling to conduct the investigation in a fair 
and impartial manner, but on the other hand, the ICC is dependent on the very same 
national authorities to execute key steps of the judicial process. Importantly, this includes, for 
example, the initial arrest and transfer of suspects and defendants. It is therefore not 
surprising that many of the cases before the ICC may have had less than perfect records as 
concerns the fairness and impartiality with which the defendant was treated by national 
authorities. It is questionable, however, whether this political reality should inform the 
prosecutorial and judicial approach taken by the Court towards such violations. 
The dependency of the ICC on states is further heightened by the fact that unlike the 
ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC does not ordinarily possess Chapter VII enforcement powers,91 
and can thus only request assistance from states which have ratified or acceded to the Rome 
Statute. The difficulty of translating a treaty-based cooperation agreement into effective 
enforcement action against potentially dangerous persons was illustrated very early on at the 
ICC by the failure of the Uganda government, and perhaps more pointedly by surrounding 
countries, to enforce the arrest warrants against Joseph Kony and other members of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army. Even worse difficulties have arisen in the situations of Sudan and 
Libya, which were Chapter VII referrals. It is therefore not surprising that for the next two 
cases, the Prosecutor decided to target two persons who had already been arrested and 
detained by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was placed under house arrest by DRC authorities in 2004. 
Subsequently, both Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain Katanga, who are allegedly 
associated with opposing militia/political parties, were initially arrested by the DRC 
authorities in connection with the killing of peacekeepers attached to the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in 
March 2005. Although the DRC authorities eventually charged other persons with this 
killing, both Lubanga and Katanga were kept in detention by the national authorities for 
                                                           
 91. It is a matter of debate among scholars whether this changes when the Security Council has 
referred a situation to the ICC in accordance with Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and Article 13(b) 
of the Rome Statute. See, e.g., Paola Gaeta, Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?, 
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alleged responsibility for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity taking place 
before 2004. 
The DRC authorities remained in contact with the ICC Prosecutor throughout this time 
period, and informed them that no investigative moves were being taken against Lubanga.92 
In this connection, the ICC does not have an equivalent to the ICTY/ICTR Rule 40—the 
Prosecutor does not explicitly possess the power to formally request national authorities to 
provisionally detain a suspect, pending the issuance of an arrest warrant by the Court. At the 
same time, the Statute and Rules do not prohibit the Prosecutor from informally 
communicating such a wish to national authorities. 
In January 2006, the ICC Prosecutor filed an application for an arrest warrant against 
Lubanga.93 In terms of the timing of the application, the Prosecutor noted that under DRC 
law, the defendant had a right to be brought before a judge within twelve months of his initial 
arrest. The ICC Prosecution was therefore concerned that “the apparent absence of 
investigative acts performed since the arrest of Thomas LUBANGA DYILO [would provide] 
sufficient legal basis for that judge to authorize his release.”94 The Pre-Trial Chamber 
eventually granted the application, and, subsequent to his transfer to the ICC, the defense 
challenged the jurisdiction of the court and sought the defendant’s release on the basis that 
his arbitrary detention in the DRC constituted an abuse of process.95 The defense also argued 
in the alternative, that even if the violations were not sufficiently grave to warrant the 
cessation of the proceedings, the Chamber should nonetheless grant an appropriate remedy. 
For instance, in its submission, the Chamber should take into consideration his prior 
detention in the DRC when considering his eligibility for provisional release.96 
On appeal,97 the Appeals Chamber held that while the Statute and Rules did not explicitly 
provide for any legal basis under which the proceedings could be stayed due to an abuse of 
process, Article 21(3) of the Statute mandate that the Chamber apply the provisions of the 
Rome Statute in a manner that is consistent with internationally recognized human rights 
norms.98 The appeals judges referred to the overriding obligation under human rights law to 
ensure that the proceedings as a whole were fair, and concluded that “[w]here fair trial 
becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect or the 
accused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to put the person on trial.”99 
                                                           
 92. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Defence Appeal against the 
Decision on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006, ¶ 32 (Oct. 26, 2006), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc243795.pdf. 
 93. Id.  
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original). 
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Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
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Accordingly, “[w]here the breaches of the rights of the accused are such as to make it 
impossible for him/her to make his/her defence within the framework of his rights, no fair 
trial can take place and the proceedings can be stayed.”100 
Regrettably, the ICC Appeals Chamber did not clearly delineate what type of 
circumstances would render it impossible to have a fair trial. For example, it is possible that 
the defendant could suffer egregious violations of his rights in connection with his arrest and 
detention by national authorities. The subsequent proceedings conducted before the ICC 
might nonetheless be conducted in a fair manner. Would it be possible to conclude that the 
proceedings as a whole were fair, or would the earlier violations taint the fairness of the 
entire trial? The ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence is clearer in this respect as it specifies that the 
courts will consider the violations to constitute an abuse of process either if it is no longer 
possible to convene a fair trial, or the violations have contravened the tribunal’s sense of 
justice. 
The judgment is also opaque concerning whether the defendant must prove that the 
violations of his rights can be attributed to the ICC itself. The Appeals Chamber notes that 
the defense had failed to demonstrate that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s conclusion that there was 
no concerted action between the DRC and the ICC Prosecutor was erroneous, but the Appeals 
Chamber does not then clarify whether it was actually necessary for the defense to prove the 
existence of concerted action.101 In this regard, the Appeals Chamber does not squarely 
address the issue of due diligence, which is separate from the issue of responsibility. Although 
obviously not binding at the ICC in a technical sense, there was no consideration of the ICTR 
Kajelijeli appeals decision which would have been instructive. The judges failed to take up the 
issue of whether the Prosecution, even if it had not been involved in the violations of the 
defendant’s rights, had a positive obligation to minimize these violations, for example, by 
applying for the defendant’s arrest warrant in a timely manner. 
Finally, and perhaps even more egregiously, the decision does not consider whether the 
defendant should have been entitled to an alternative remedy—for example, a reduction in 
sentence, or compensation as is required by Article 85(1) of the Rome Statute, which provides 
that “[a]nyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation.”102 The Appeals Chamber simply notes that “the crimes for 
which Mr. Lubanga Dyilo was detained by the Congolese authority were separate and 
distinct from those which led to the issuance of the warrant for his arrest.”103 Since other 
provisions of the Statute, which address the relationship of ICC proceedings to domestic 
proceedings, refer to “conduct” and not “crimes,”104 it is unfortunate that the Appeals 
                                                           
 100. Id. ¶ 39. 
 101. Id. ¶ 42. 
 102. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 85, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a84.html. 
 103. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
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Chamber appears to have adopted a narrower requirement that the defendant must prove 
that there is a correlation between the specific crimes underlying the domestic proceedings 
and those of the ICC. In some cases, it may be impossible for the defendant to prove such a 
correlation. 
For example, Lubanga had not been detained by the Congolese authorities for any specific 
crimes, which was itself a violation of his right to be informed of the nature of the charges for 
which he had been detained. In the absence of any details concerning the factual basis for his 
detention in the DRC, it would be difficult for him to draw a specific correlation between the 
national proceedings and the ICC charges. It is also apparent that the DRC authorities 
considered that the transfer of the defendant to the ICC effectively closed the proceedings in 
the DRC.105 As such, absent any possible remedial action through regional or international 
human rights complaint processes, the ICC would be the only court before which the 
defendant would be entitled to seek a remedy in connection with his allegations of arbitrary 
detention. 
The failure of either the Pre-Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber to discuss the notion 
of due diligence within the context of the rights of suspects who have been apprehended and 
detained by national authorities is particularly disappointing given that the Pre-Trial 
Chambers have a record of actively policing the investigations of the Prosecutor in order to 
enforce the rights of putative victims.106 It is also arguable that, by failing to set out 
standards of prosecutorial due diligence and effectively looking the other way, the Appeals 
Chamber placed its imprimatur on the practice of detaining possible ICC suspects in domestic 
prisons indefinitely or until such time that the Prosecutor decided to file an application for an 
ICC arrest warrant against the suspect in question. 
The impact this had on the proceedings is exemplified by the decision of the Prosecutor not 
to apply for an arrest warrant against Germain Katanga until June 25, 2007, even though 
the Prosecution was aware that he had been in detention since March 2005. In this case, 
there was a clearer correlation between the domestic proceedings and the ICC case, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the ICC Prosecution was relying on statements taken by 
national authorities from the defendant whilst he was in detention.107 Nonetheless, the 
question whether the defendant should have a remedy for the alleged violations of his rights 
was never addressed on the merits, as the Pre-Trial Chamber held that the defense had filed 
its application too late (even though there is no deadline for abuse of process motions in the 
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01/04, Public Redacted Version: Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of 
VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc183441.PDF. 
 107. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Public 
Redacted Version: Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 79–99 (Sept. 30, 2008), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf.  
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Statute or Rules, and the Chamber had not set a specific deadline for filing the motion).108 
This decision to dismiss the application on procedural grounds was narrowly upheld by the 
Appeals Chamber.109 There are, however, two very powerful and well-reasoned dissenting 
opinions from Judges Kourula and Trendafilova concerning the effect of such a decision on 
the defendant’s right of access to a court and right to an effective remedy.110 
More recently, in the case involving former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo, the accused 
requested a stay of proceedings in a preliminary motion challenging the ICC’s jurisdiction. He 
argued that because his fundamental fair trial rights were violated by Ivorian authorities, 
between the period of his arrest on April 11, 2011 and his transfer to the Court on November 
29, 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber should decline to exercise its jurisdiction and order a 
permanent cessation of the proceedings against him.111 He claimed, inter alia, that he had 
been arbitrarily arrested, detained, and tortured by the national authorities and that the 
Prosecutor, who was in contact with those entities, was effectively complicit in his 
mistreatment insofar as she could have but failed to request the Ivory Coast to end the grave 
violations of his rights.112  
In its decision, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that, although this aspect of Gbagbo’s 
motion did not in fact constitute a valid jurisdictional challenge, it would still exercise its 
jurisdiction to hear the matter given the seriousness of the defense allegations and the Pre-
Trial Chamber’s inherent power to stay proceedings in cases of abuse of process.113 The 
judges then examined the merits of the defense motion but concluded that the Ivorian 
authorities had not detained the defendant at the ICC Prosecutor’s behest or that of another 
organ of the Court.114 This implied that, had that been the case, the Pre-Trial Chamber would 
have likely assessed the role that the ICC entity played in impacting the defendant’s rights 
through the action of the national authorities. Indeed, the judges ruled that the defense failed 
to proffer relevant evidence substantiating the claim that the ICC Prosecutor had something 
to do with Gbagbo’s arrest, charge, and detention in his home country. They observed that 
                                                           
 108. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Public 
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even the defense had conceded that these steps had no apparent link to the proceedings 
before the Court because they related to economic crimes.115 
Presumably, if the arrest had been attributable to an ICC organ, some type of remedy 
would have accrued if the judges determined that there had been a serious violation of his 
rights. In contrast, when the Prosecutor actually requested that the national authorities 
arrest him, the Chamber observed that the suspect’s rights, including the fundamental ones 
to be informed of the charges against him and to be brought before a national judge, were 
respected. This took place only four days from the date of transmission of the Court’s official 
request that the Ivorian authorities effect his arrest—the moment from which they would 
consider that he had been detained pursuant to the ICC Prosecutor’s—and therefore the 
Court’s—authority.116 
Unfortunately, upon appeal of the decision denying a stay of proceedings, the Appeals 
Chamber dismissed Gbagbo’s request for a reversal of the Pre-Trial Chamber in limine.117 
The presiding judge determined that the impugned decision, which was not a decision about 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 82(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, could have only been appealed 
with leave of the Pre-Trial Chamber which the defense never sought and obtained as required 
by Article 82(1)(d).118 
In its recent Gbagbo decision, in which it invoked procedural irregularities to dismiss the 
defense appeal, the Appeals Chamber denied itself the opportunity of clarifying the 
ambiguities in its earlier decisions, for example, whether it would be necessary for the 
defense to establish the existence of concerted action between the ICC and the national organ, 
and if so, the degree of violation that would be required for the purposes of triggering the 
imputation of responsibility to the ICC organ. Indeed, it is notable that other courts, for 
instance the ECCC in the Duch case which will be discussed below, had interpreted the 
Lubanga decision to support a broad form of responsibility for pre-transfer violations of the 
defendant’s rights. The Pre-Trial Chamber decision in Gbagbo, which showed sensitivity to 
the human rights of the defendant, also arguably follows this broad tend. 
C. The Practice of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia 
The first suspect to be arrested by Cambodian authorities in connection with the alleged 
crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge became the unfortunate victim of the protracted 
bureaucratic wrangling between Cambodian and U.N. officials concerning the legal details for 
establishing a tribunal to prosecute these alleged crimes. The defendant Kaing Guek Eav 
(alias “Duch”) was arrested by Cambodian authorities in May 1999 pursuant to an arrest 
warrant issued by the Military Court.119 The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
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Chambers in the Courts in Cambodia (ECCC Law) entered into force on August 10, 2001, but 
the Court was not yet physically established at that point in time.120 From 2002 until 2007, 
the Military Court issued orders for his detention based on the ECCC Law. On July 30, 2007, 
the defendant was physically transferred to the ECCC Detention Unit pursuant to an order of 
the ECCC co-investigating judges.121 The defendant was thus held in detention by national 
authorities for more than eight years prior to the commencement of his case before the ECCC. 
The defense argued that this prior detention violated Article 9 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),122 and should be imputed to the ECCC 
judicial authorities. The investigating judge should therefore have taken this time period into 
consideration when determining whether it was appropriate to order his continued 
provisional detention.123 The defense did not, however, seek the termination of the case on 
this basis. 
The co-investigating judges dismissed the arguments on the grounds that the ECCC had 
no jurisdiction to consider the legality of his detention prior to the establishment of the 
ECCC.124 On appeal, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that it would only be able to take into 
account violations of Article 9 of the ICCPR if “the organ responsible for the violation was 
connected to an organ of the ECCC, or had been acting on behalf of any organ of the ECCC or 
                                                                                                                                                       
3, 2007), 
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in concert with organs of the ECCC.”125 The Pre-Trial Chamber then proceeded to examine 
the relationship between the ECCC and domestic authorities, in particular, the Military 
Court that had ordered the defendant’s arrest. The Chamber observed that the applicable law 
before the ECCC did not give the ECCC jurisdiction over actions by domestic courts.126 There 
were also several distinctions between the ECCC and domestic courts, for example, the ECCC 
Chambers were composed of both national and foreign judges, whom would not be eligible to 
sit in Cambodian courts.127 
Of greater relevance, the Chamber also emphasized that the ECCC should be considered 
to be an independent entity from the Cambodian court system: decisions of the ECCC cannot 
be reviewed by any court outside its structure, and there is no corresponding right for the 
ECCC to review decisions made by domestic courts.128 The Chamber ultimately concluded 
that the co-investigating judges did not err in excluding this period of detention from their 
consideration as to whether it was necessary to order the continued detention of the 
defendant under Rule 63(3) of the Internal Rules.129 The defense resurrected the issue before 
the Trial Chamber in conjunction with a request for release, in which the defendant further 
requested that his prior detention be taken into consideration for sentencing purposes, and 
that this should include a reduction to compensate him for the violation of his rights. 
The Trial Chamber confirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s finding that the ECCC was a 
specialized court which operated independently from the Cambodian court system.130 The 
Chamber therefore held that neither the fact that the Military Court had cited ECCC law in 
its detention order, nor the fact that it had issued an order terminating the case subsequent 
to the defendant’s transfer to the ECCC demonstrated that there was any continuity between 
the acts of the Military Court and the ECCC.131 
In contrast to the finding of the Pre-Trial Chamber that the ECCC would only have 
jurisdiction to rule on these alleged violations if they could in same way be attributed to the 
ECCC, the Trial Chamber noted its obligation to apply its internal rules in a manner 
consistent with international standards set out in human rights conventions. The judges also 
considered the jurisprudence of international courts, and surmised that “[e]ven if a violation 
of the Accused’s right cannot be attributed to the ECCC, international jurisprudence 
indicates that an international criminal tribunal has both the authority and the obligation to 
consider the legality of his prior detention.”132 The Chamber expressly cited the 1999 
Barayagwiza decision in support of this conclusion.133 
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Later in the decision, the Chamber made a valiant attempt to reconcile the disparate 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC concerning the relationship between the 
defendant’s right to a remedy and the abuse of process doctrine. The Chamber firstly cited a 
2000 ICTR Rwamakuba Trial Chamber decision to the effect that violations of a defendant’s 
rights will only be attributed to the tribunal if there has been concerted action between it and 
the national authorities.134 However, even if there has been no concerted action, the Trial 
Chamber found that the abuse of process doctrine constitutes an additional safeguard, in that 
the Court may be required to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant if there have 
been fundamental breaches of the rights of the accused that rendered a fair trial impossible, 
or serious mistreatment, irrespective of the identity of the authority of the violations.135 
Finally, the Chamber noted that even if the violations did not reach the standard of an 
abuse of process, in accordance with the case law of the ICTR Appeals Chamber, the 
defendant might still have a right to a remedy other than termination of the case for 
violations committed by the national authorities.136 This right to a remedy was generally 
addressed at the sentencing stage, and was comprised of sentencing credit for both the time 
which the defendant had spent in detention by the national authorities, and additional credit 
to separately compensate for the violations.137 If the defendant was acquitted, he would have 
to seek compensation before national authorities. 
In examining the facts, the Trial Chamber held that under Cambodian law, the defendant 
could only be detained for a maximum of three years for genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.138 In addition, the case file revealed a lack of investigative activity and a 
lack of factual reasoning in the detention orders.139 The Military Court also applied several 
laws on a retrospective basis.140 The Chamber therefore concluded that the defendant’s prior 
detention violated both Cambodian law, the defendant’s right to trial within a reasonable 
time, and his right to be detained in accordance with the law.141 
In terms of appropriate remedies, the Chamber made two main observations. First, if the 
defendant had been tried by the Military Court, he would have been entitled to sentencing 
credit for the time during which he was detained pursuant to the orders of the Military 
Court.142 Second, the defendant had been detained by the Military Court for “investigation of 
allegations broadly similar to those being considered in this trial.”143 The Chamber therefore 
decided that the defendant should be granted sentencing credit for the entire duration of his 
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detention under the authority of the Military Court.144 In its final judgment, the Trial 
Chamber also assessed that he should be granted a reduction in sentence of five years in 
order to separately compensate him for the violations of his rights which had occurred during 
this time period.145 
Although the Co-Prosecutors neither objected to nor appealed this aspect of the Trial 
Chamber’s sentence and its disposition, in their February 2012 judgment, the Supreme Court 
Chamber of the ECCC reviewed the issue ex proprio motu as a question of law.146 It deemed 
this appropriate as they amended Duch’s sentence upwards. The judges then discussed the 
matter and determined that the Trial Chamber had misconstrued the law when it held, on 
the basis of an erroneous interpretation of the ICTR jurisprudence, that Duch could be 
entitled to a remedy even in 1) the absence of violations attributable to the ECCC and 2) in 
the absence of a showing of abuse of process.147 
To the contrary, after a review primarily of the Barayagwiza, Semanza, Kajelijeli, and 
Rwamakuba decisions discussed above, the majority ruled that the Trial Chamber should 
have rejected the defendant’s request for a remedy. It explained that at least some form of 
responsibility should accrue to the ECCC for such a measure to be justified.148 In the final 
analysis, it explained, the ICTR case law establishes that “violations of human rights must 
either constitute an abuse of process or be attributed to the Tribunal in order to grant the 
accused a remedy, and also that such remedies have always been granted in connection to 
failures by the Prosecutor or another organ of the Tribunal.”149 
However, in a lucid partial dissenting opinion, Judges Klonowiecka-Milart and Jayasinghe 
argued that the majority’s adoption of ad hoc tribunal case law and application to the ECCC 
context was both unnecessary and inappropriate. In particular, the majority had failed to 
take into account the legal character of the ECCC as a hybrid court in respect of which there 
was “shared responsibility” distinct from the standalone nature of the ICTY and the ICTR 
which therefore enjoyed some distance from national jurisdictions.150 The Cambodia situation 
was different and raises a separate question as to whether a hybrid court ought to be held 
accountable for the actions of the domestic system in instances where the former benefitted 
from the actions of the institutions associated with the national jurisdiction.151 In Duch’s case, 
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according to the dissenters, this was due to his detention by the military authorities. They 
then advanced several factors, all of which militated in favor of granting a remedy to the 
defendant in that particular case. The key considerations included (i) the extent to which the 
sentencing court is integrated into the domestic system; (ii) the nexus between the violation 
and the proceedings before the sentencing court; (iii) the gravity of the violation, which must 
rise to a violation of fundamental rights; (iv) whether an appropriate remedy is within the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court; and (v) whether granting the remedy would frustrate the 
mandate of the sentencing court by, for example, requiring the immediate release of the 
defendant.152 
Based on an analysis of these factors, the partially dissenting judges concluded that the 
ECCC was obligated to consider its responsibility for the Military Court’s detention of Duch 
before his transfer to ECCC custody. Ultimately, they considered it more compatible with 
international human rights law for the tribunal to grant the sentencing reduction and 
imprison him for thirty years instead of increasing his sentence to life imprisonment. 
Importantly, the dissent recognized that the defendant would otherwise have been left 
without a remedy even in the face of a flagrant violation of his rights.153 
D. The Practice of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) shares some of the same attributes of the 
preceding courts and tribunals, in particular, its dependence on national authorities for 
arresting and transferring suspects to the court’s custody. Moreover, as was the case with the 
ECCC, the national authorities took action against specific suspects before the tribunal was 
fully operational, with a view to eventually transferring the suspects to the STL. Four 
Lebanese generals—Messrs. Jamil Mohamad Amin El Sayed, Ali Salah El Dine El Hajj, 
Raymond Fouad Azar and Mr Mostafa Fehmi Hamdan—were detained on August 30, 
2005.154 
The early jurisprudence and practice of the STL has, however, departed from its 
institutional antecedents in that all the organs—the Prosecutor, President, Pre-Trial Judge 
and Defence Office—have proactively taken measures to ensure that there were no gaps 
concerning the enforcement of the suspects’ rights. For instance, they seem to have tried to 
ensure that the suspects’ rights concerning the conditions of detention were respected (even 
though they were not physically within the custody of the Tribunal), that the suspects were 
not arbitrarily detained, and that they be accorded a remedy for any violations of their rights. 
As concerns the defendant’s protection against arbitrary detention, on March 25, 2009, the 
Prosecutor filed a request that the Pre-Trial Judge order the Lebanese authorities to defer to 
the competence of the STL, and to hand over the results of the investigations and the list of 
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detained persons to the STL.155 The Pre-Trial Judge granted this request on March 27, 2009, 
and further ordered the Lebanese authorities, in accordance with Rule 17, “to continue to 
detain those persons held in Lebanon in connection with the case from the time of the 
Prosecutor’s receipt of the results of the investigation by the Lebanese authority and the copy 
of the Lebanese court records until the issuance of a decision by the Pre-Trial Judge.”156 
On April 15, 2009, the Pre-Trial Judge issued an order which held that although the four 
detainees were physically detained by the Lebanese authorities, they should nonetheless be 
considered to be detained under the authority of the STL as of April 10, 2009, which was the 
date that the Lebanese authorities transferred the results of their investigation.157 At the 
same time, the Pre-Trial Judge established a stringent deadline (April 27, 2009) by which the 
Prosecutor was to file a reasoned application as to whether he requested the continued 
detention of the four suspects.158 
On April 21, 2009, in response to an application by the Defence Office, the President 
issued an order that considered the conditions of detention of the four suspects, namely the 
fact that they were being segregated from all other detainees (which amounts to de facto 
isolation) and had been denied the right to privileged communications with their counsel.159 
The President noted that the Tribunal’s Rules of Detention only applied to persons who were 
physically detained by the Tribunal, and as such, were formally inapplicable in light of the 
fact that the suspects were detained in Lebanon. The President nonetheless opined that “the 
Tribunal must be able to exercise some form of supervision over their detention. Without such 
supervision by the Tribunal, the rights of the detained persons may be gravely compromised 
and they may be left without any effective remedy against a potential violation of their 
rights.”160 Notably, the President cited the Kajelijeli appeals judgment in support of this 
proposition.161 
The President therefore relied on his general obligation under Rule 32(2) to supervise 
conditions of detention, and his power under Rule 101(G), which allows the President to 
request the modification of conditions of detention for persons detained outside of the Host 
State (i.e., the Netherlands).162 He therefore ordered the Lebanese authorities “to ensure that 
the right of the detained persons to freely and privately communicate with their counsel be 
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fully implemented,” and “to terminate the regime of segregation of the detained persons and 
to ensure that, in keeping with any security regime deemed appropriate, the detained persons 
be allowed to communicate with each other upon request, for a period of two hours per 
day.”163 
In response to the deadline set by the Pre-Trial Judge for the Prosecutor to request the 
continued detention of the four suspects, the Prosecutor filed a motion, in which he informed 
the Pre-Trial Judge that the information which was currently available was insufficiently 
credible to warrant the indictment of the four suspects.164 The Prosecutor noted that under 
the Rules, a suspect could not be detained for more than ninety days unless an indictment 
was confirmed against the suspect, and therefore requested that the suspects be released 
immediately.165 The Pre-Trial Judge granted the request.166 
Not surprisingly, given the fact that he had been kept in detention without being charged 
for four years, one of the released suspects, Mr. Jamil El Sayed, subsequently attempted to 
obtain a remedy in domestic courts under Lebanese laws concerning libelous denunciation 
and arbitrary detention. In order to sustain such a claim, and in light of the fact that the 
investigative files had been transferred to the STL, Mr. Sayed filed a request before the 
Tribunal to obtain information concerning the circumstances of his initial detention by 
Lebanese authorities. 
In the Pre-Trial Judge’s decision, the judge held that whilst neither the Statute nor the 
Rules provide for an explicit right to access the documents concerning a person’s detention, 
the power to grant access to such documents should be considered to fall within the implicit 
powers of the Tribunal, as the request was closely connected to the subject-matter jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal, and it would be consistent with the “interests of fairness of the proceedings 
and good administration of justice.”167 The Judge further emphasized that since the Lebanese 
authorities’ deferral to the competence of the court on April 10, 2009, the STL was the sole 
court with jurisdiction over the events in question, and the only court with access to the 
documentation.168 Moreover, if the Tribunal were to find that it did not have jurisdiction over 
the request, “the Tribunal would deprive the Applicant of any possibility to have his basic 
rights vindicated by a judge. It would thus exclude the Applicant from the right to effective 
judicial protection.”169 
                                                           
 163. Id. at 11–12. 
 164. Submission of the Prosecutor to the Pre-Trial Judge Under Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/004 (Special Trib. for Lebanon Apr. 27, 2009), 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court%20Documents/STL/STL_Reasoned%20submission%2
0as%20filed_270409.pdf. 
 165. Id. ¶ 22.  
 166. Order Regarding the Detention of Persons Detained in Lebanon in Connection with the Case of the 
Attack against Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Others, Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/06 (Special Trib. for 
Lebanon Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court%20Documents/STL/Order-
Regarding-the-Detention-of-Persons-Detained-in-Lebanon.pdf. 
 167. Order Relating to the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to Rule on the Application by Mr. El Sayed Dated 
17 March 2010 and Whether Mr. El Sayed Has Standing before the Tribunal, ¶ 32, Case No. 
CH/PTJ/2010/005 (Special Trib. for Lebanon Sept. 17, 2010), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/stl/eng/decisions/2010.09.17_In_the_Matter_of_El_Sayed.pdf. 
 168. Id. ¶ 34. 
 169. Id. ¶ 35. 
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The Pre-Trial Judge thus concluded that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the request, 
and furthermore, that the applicant had standing to request the relief sought from the 
Tribunal even though he was no longer a party to the proceedings. Having determined these 
threshold issues, as of writing, the judge is receiving observations from the Prosecutor and 
the Applicant concerning the merits of his request for access to the case file. In November 
2010, the Special Tribunal also amended its Rules of Procedure and Evidence to provide that 
anyone who has been “illegally arrested or detained under the authority of the Tribunal as a 
result of a serious miscarriage of justice, . . . may file a request to the President for 
compensation or other appropriate redress within six months of the issuance of the final 
judgment or decision.”170 
III. Conclusion and Recommendations 
It is encouraging that the jurisprudence of the different courts and tribunals has gradually 
evolved in a positive manner, towards recognition that “the international division of labour in 
prosecuting crimes must not be to the detriment of the apprehended person,”171 and that any 
violations of the defendant’s rights requires a remedy even if the threshold for release has not 
been met. According to the above jurisprudence of the different courts, the position of a 
defendant, who has been arbitrarily detained by national authorities, may be summarized as 
follows. 
First, if the Prosecutor/investigating authority is aware that a person suspected of crimes 
falling under the jurisdiction of the court/tribunal had been arrested by national authorities, 
they have a positive duty to notify the court/tribunal, and inform national authorities of their 
duty to ensure that the rights of the defendant are respected.172 Second, once the Prosecutor 
has requested the arrest of the defendant or assumed jurisdiction over the case, even if the 
defendant is detained by national authorities and not at the seat of the court, the defendant 
should not be detained for more than ninety days prior to the issuance of an indictment. 
Third, the court will likely find that there has been an abuse of process if the violations of the 
defendant’s rights have rendered it impossible to have a fair trial. Fourth, the court will also 
be likely to find that there has been an abuse of process if the procedures have been tainted to 
such an extent that it offends the court’s sense of justice. Fifth, the defendant does not need to 
establish the existence of concerted action between the organs of the court and the national 
authorities, but such concerted action could be an aggravating factor, or it could be the factor 
which offends the court’s sense of justice, which places the violation in the second category of 
abuse of process. 
Sixth, in order to trigger the abuse of process doctrine or to justify the release of the 
defendant, the violations must be egregious. The ICC has held that the severity of the 
violations is not necessarily relevant—what is more relevant is whether it is possible to 
                                                           
 170. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 170(D), entered into force Mar. 
20, 2009, available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/images/RPE/RPE_EN_February_2013.pdf.  
 171. Juvénal Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, ¶ 220 (May 23, 2005), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kajelijeli/judgement/appealsjudgement.doc.pdf. 
 172. The ICTY has not pronounced on this issue, but would presumably follow the ICTR. The Pre-Trial 
Judge at the STL has exercised this role, and the ICC and ECCC have not set out any due diligence 
standards as concerns pre-transfer detention.  
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (2013) 
332 
convene a fair trial.173 Seventh, even if the threshold for an abuse of process has not been 
met, the defendant will still have a right to a remedy for any violations of his rights. Eighth, if 
the defendant is convicted, the defendant will be entitled to sentencing credit for the time for 
which he was detained at the request of the court/tribunal, and also any time for which he 
was detained in connection with “broadly similar allegations,” even if the court/tribunal had 
not requested his detention. Finally, in addition to credit for time served, the defendant is 
also entitled separately to a reduction of his or her sentence as a remedy for the violation 
itself. Article 85(1) of the Rome Statute provides that “[a]nyone who has been the victim of 
unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”174 It is not 
clear whether the right to compensation will only include financial compensation or could also 
include a sentence reduction if the defendant is convicted. The broader interpretation, which 
enables this right to include both the possibility of a financial award and reduction in jail 
term, ought to be preferred.  
At the same time, notwithstanding the above, it is also possible to discern the following 
relatively more negative trends. First, the courts have been highly influenced by the realities 
of state/international cooperation, which weakens the likelihood that they would offer strong 
remedies to a defendant whose rights have been violated. Second, the imposition of rigid 
procedural and evidentiary requirements can render the right to a remedy illusory. Third, 
whilst the courts have not explicitly required the defendant to demonstrate concerted action 
between the international/hybrid court and national authorities, the absence of such 
concerted action is likely to impact the court’s assessment as to whether the violation is 
linked to the proceedings before the court, and whether the violation is sufficiently grave to 
warrant a remedy. Fourth, the practice of the courts in granting the defendant a reduction in 
sentence as a remedy is unlikely to have any deterrent effects against the Prosecutor or 
national authorities pursuing such practices in the future. Fifth, as recognized by the 1999 
Barayagwiza decision, financial compensation cannot compensate an acquitted person for the 
loss of family life which he or she has experienced whilst being arbitrarily detained. It is 
therefore disappointing that the ICC in particular has not established any standards of 
prosecutorial diligence which would minimize the possibility of such violations occurring in 
the future. 
In light of the above analysis and conclusions, the authors therefore propose the following 
recommendations: 
                                                           
 173. Rome Statute, supra note 102, art. 85(1). 
 174. In the Lubanga Appeals Chamber judgment of December 14, 2006, the ICC Appeals Chamber found 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s focus on the severity of the violations was irrelevant: 
As may be discerned from the principles identified in the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
as relevant to stay of proceedings, a broader standard was adopted than the one warranted 
in law in that it failed to require the specific consideration of whether a fair trial remained 
possible in the particular circumstances of the case. The findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
to the effect that the appellant was not subjected to any ill-treatment in the process of his 
arrest and conveyance before the Court sidelines the importance of the precise ambit of the 
test applied as a guide to the resolution of this appeal. 
 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), Judgment on the Appeal of 
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 40 (Dec. 14, 2006), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc243774.pdf. 
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• If the Prosecutor becomes aware that national authorities have detained a person 
who could be considered a suspect falling under the respective international 
court/tribunal’s jurisdiction, she should inform the national authorities of its duty 
to ensure that the rights of this suspect—as set out in national legislation, 
applicable treaties, and customary international human rights law—are 
respected. 
• Pre-Trial Chambers should monitor and uphold the rights of suspects during the 
investigative phase. While there is a risk that this could be seen as stepping on 
prosecutorial turf, the Chamber should request the Prosecution to notify the 
judges if any investigative targets are being detained by national authorities, 
with a view to monitoring whether the proceedings are being conducted with due 
diligence. 
• Although the potential subjects of the Prosecution’s investigations will generally 
be confidential, as demonstrated by the STL, internal defense offices can also play 
a role in monitoring the rights of suspects prior to their transfer to the 
court/tribunal in question, and petitioning the Chamber to take appropriate 
measures. 
• In the absence of any applicable statutory provisions, the court, which has the 
duty to ensure that the processes before it comply with international fair trial 
standards, should clearly inform the defense in advance of the procedural 
requirements and deadlines for filing an application seeking a remedy for 
violations of their rights which have occurred prior to their arrest/detention. 
Where such procedural time limitations impact negatively on the suspect’s rights, 
under the relevant rules, the fundamental fair trial guarantees under the Statute 
and under human rights law would mandate that discretion be exercised to favor 
upholding the rights of the suspect or accused. 
• The court should also ensure that the defense has adequate time and resources to 
prepare such an application. The court should monitor the Prosecution’s 
disclosure obligations to ensure that any information concerning the relationship 
between the Prosecution and national authorities which might be relevant to 
such an application is disclosed, and is not unduly withheld due to security 
reasons. In accordance with human rights jurisprudence,175 if any information 
concerning the defendant’s claim is within the custody of the state and the state 
refuses to disclose this information, or the state has provided the information to 
the Prosecution on condition of confidentiality and refuses to lift the 
                                                           
 175. Velásquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 135 (July 
29, 1988). See also Ipek v. Turkey, 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R. (extracts), ¶¶ 111–13 (2004); Orhan v. 
Turkey, Application No. 25656/94, Judgment, ¶ 266 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 18, 2002) (“It is inherent in 
proceedings relating to cases of this nature, where an individual applicant accuses State agents of 
violating his rights under the Convention, that in certain instances solely the respondent 
Government have access to information capable of corroborating or refuting these allegations. A 
failure on a Government’s part to submit such information which is in their hands without a 
satisfactory explanation may not only give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-
foundedness of the applicant’s allegations, but may also reflect negatively on the level of compliance 
by a respondent State with its obligations . . . .”). See also id. ¶ 274. 
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confidentiality vis-à-vis the defense—the court should draw the appropriate 
inferences of fact in favor of the defendant. 
• When evaluating whether the defendant’s rights have been violated, the court 
should adopt a defendant-centric inquiry: the primary emphasis should be on 
whether the defendant’s rights have been violated, rather than requiring the 
defendant to establish wrongdoing or responsibility on the part of an organ of the 
tribunal as a preliminary step. Prosecutorial/tribunal wrongdoing should be an 
aggravating factor rather than a prerequisite. 
• Even if the violation in question does not meet the requisite threshold to justify a 
stay of the proceedings and the release of the defendant, the Chamber should also 
consider whether it is appropriate to grant alternative remedies. 
• It is questionable whether the severity of the alleged crime that the defendant 
has been charged with should be a deciding factor in determining the appropriate 
remedy. As stated by the ICC Appeals Chamber—“a fair trial is the only means to 
do justice”176—this maxim holds true irrespective of whether the defendant has 
been charged with petty crimes or genocide—the “crime of crimes.”177 If the 
violations have compromised the fairness of the judicial process, the proceedings 
should be stayed. Moreover, whilst the objective of eliminating impunity is a 
laudable raison d’être for these courts, it should also be borne in mind that 
arbitrary arrest and detention can be so egregious in nature and impact on an 
individual as to attract the moral and legal condemnation that we may properly 
call crimes against human rights. The remedy provided by the court must 
therefore be effective in deterring the Prosecutor/national authorities from 
engaging in such practices in the future. 
• The courts/tribunals should also bear in mind that if the defendant is acquitted, 
financial compensation cannot fully compensate a person for the loss of his or her 
family life which he or she may have experienced during the period of arbitrary 
detention. For this reason, the court should include a period of domestic detention 
in its calculation concerning whether the defendant has been detained for an 
unreasonable length of time and should therefore be provisionally released. 
Similarly, if the defendant is convicted, this period of time should automatically 
be included in the credit for time served which is deducted from the sentence. 
Such credit is a right, however, and not a remedy for the violation itself. The 
defendant should therefore be granted a separate remedy in addition to a 
sentencing credit, for example, financial compensation or a further reduction of 
sentence. 
 
 
                                                           
176.  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeal of 
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction 
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